We introduce two ways of comparing information structures, say I and J . First we say that I is richer than J when for every compact game G, all correlated equilibrium distributions of G induced by J are also induced by I. Second, we say that J is faithfully reproducable from I when all the players can compute from their information in I "new information" that they could have received from J . We prove that I is richer than J if and only if J is faithfully reproducable from I.
Introduction
Information structures were defined by Aumann ([Au74] ) to introduce the concepts of correlated equilibrium and of correlated equilibrium distributions.
Given a game G and an information structure I, the game G extended by I is the game in which players first receive information according to I, and second play in G. The distributions on the actions of G induced by Nash equilibria of this game are called the correlated equilibrium distributions of G induced by I.
For instance, it is well known that before playing the game "battle of sexes": otherwise. This defines a Nash equilibrium of the game extended by the dice information structure inducing the same distribution as before. The fact that a coin can be replaced by a die does not depend on the particular (battle of sexes) game. In fact, for any game G, all correlated equilibrium distributions of G induced by the coin are also correlated equilibrium distributions of G induced by the die. We define an information structure I to be richer than another J whenever for any game G, all correlated equilibrium distributions of G extended by J are also correlated equilibrium distributions of G extended by I.
It is striking that in correlated equilibria, players condition their actions on their information about the state of nature, even though it is common knowledge that the payoffs of the game do not depend on the state of nature. This is actually not a contradiction since, for a given player, different signals imply different beliefs on the actions of the other players, which justifies different choices of actions 1 . After getting his signal, and before playing the game, a player may forget part of his information if it reveals nothing about the actions the others are about to take. For instance, a player observing the outcome of the die and who believes that the others will act only according to the parity of the outcome may keep only the information "even", or "odd". Renaming "even" and "odd" as "heads" and "tails", we see that if they forget part of their information about the outcome of the die, players get "new" signals as if issued by a coin.
More generally, if players get signals issued by I, they can compute "new" (or interpreted) signals that could have been sent by J . An interpretation φ from I to J describes how players compute these new signals. We call an interpretation φ a compatible interpretation when the probability of the interpreted signals induced by the distribution of signals in I and by φ is equal to the probability of the signals issued by J . Moreover, a compatible interpretation is said to be a faithful interpretation when every player has the same conditional probability over the interpreted signal of the other players, conditional on his original signal (given by I) or on his interpreted one. In other words, φ is faithful if no player loses information by computing his interpreted signal and forgetting his original one.
Our main result is that I is richer than J if and only if there exists a faithful interpretation from I to J . Section 2 contains preliminaries, in Section 3 we present the different ways of comparing information structures. Section 4 contains the proof of the main result. In general, we can not assume the interpretation to be deterministic.
Players may randomize to compute their new signals. In section 5 some examples are presented, as well as conditions under which the interpretations can be assumed to be deterministic.
Preliminaries

General notations
Throughout the paper, I is the finite set of players. For every collection of sets indexed by I (Z i ) i∈I , Z represents i Z i , and Z −i is j =i Z j . Also, for z ∈ Z, z i is the i-th coordinate of z, and z −i is (z j ) j =i ∈ Z −j . For a topological set W , ∆(W ) is the set of regular probability measures over the Borel σ-algebra on W . If P is a probability measure, E P represents the expectation operator over P .
Extended games
) is given by a compact set of strategies S i for each player i and by a continuous payoff function g from S to IR I . The set of mixed strategies for player i is Σ i = ∆(S i ), and g is extended to Σ by
A Nash equilibrium of G is a profile of mixed strategies σ ∈ Σ such that fo
In [Me94] for instance, a correlation device is given by a probability space of states of nature by and a signaling function for each player that characterizes his information about the state. Equivalently, if the signaling functions have finite range, we represent information structures as probabilities over product sets of signals. An information structure I = ((X i ) i , µ) is given by a family of finite sets X i and by a probability measure µ over X. When x is drawn according to µ, i is informed about x i . Without loss of generality, we assume that all the signals of player i occur with a positive probability (for all A strategy for player i is a mapping f i from X i to Σ i , and the payoff function
Since X is finite, Γ(I, G) is also a compact game when Σ i X i is endowed with the product topology. D(I, G) represents the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of G induced by I. Namely, it is the set of image distributions on S of µ by Nash equilibria of Γ(I, G).
).
Remark 2.1
We shall use the following characterization of Nash equilibria of
f is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(I, G) if and only if for every player i and
Proof: This is simply a consequence of the relation:
This expresses the fact that a rational and bayesian player maximizes his expected payoff conditional to his information.
Comparison of information structures
In this section, we introduce two ways of comparing information structures
The first definition says that I is richer than J whenever I induces all the correlated equilibrium distributions that are induced by J .
Definition 3.1 I is richer than J whenever for every compact game G, D(I, G) ⊃ D(J , G).
For the second definition, we imagine that players receive signals from I, and define conditions under which they can reproduce signals that could have been issued by J . An interpretation mapping for player i from I to J is
is a family φ = (φ i ) i∈I of interpretation mappings for all the players. φ and For the remainder of the section φ represents a compatible interpretation from I to J . Let P be the probability induced on X ×Y by µ and the transition
The marginals of P on X and Y are µ and ν, respectively.
We shall say that φ is faithful whenever no player loses information about the interpreted signal of the others by relying on his interpreted signal and forgetting his original one. We shall express it in different ways that will turn out to be equivalent.
We can compare the conditional probabilities q(y i )(y −i ) = P (y −i /y i ) and
These can been seen as "ex ante"
and "ex post" conditional probabilities over the interpreted signals of players others than i when i's signal is x i and his interpreted signal is y i . We shall view q(y i ) and r(x i ) as random variables with values in ∆(Y −i ). Note that
Definition 3.3 An interpretation φ from I to J is faithful whenever it is compatible and for every i and x
When there exists a faithful interpretation from I to J , we say that J is faithfully reproducible
Another way of comparing information is to use the notion of comparison of experiments due to Blackwell (see [Bl51] [Bl53]). Recall that an experiment is a collection α = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) of probability measures over some (finite) spaceX. A pointx ∈X is selected according to one of the distributions (u 1 , . . . , u n ), and is observed by the statistician. Given two experiments α and
. . , n}, we say that α is sufficient for β whenever there exists a stochastic transformation from α to β, that is a family (Q(x))x ∈X of probability measures overỸ such that for all 1
When α is sufficient for β and β is suficient for α, α and β are called equivalent.
In our case, the statistician is player i, and two experiments are given by the families
Theorem 3.1 For all i, the following statements are equivalent:
In particular, φ is faithful if and only if any of these conditions is true for all player i.
Proof of the theorem:
We start the proof with a lemma :
Proof of the lemma: q(y
If for all these x i , r(x i ) takes the same value, then q(y i ) also takes this value.
where x i and y i are connected whenever φ(x i )(y i ) > 0. Now let q 0 be an
connected to x i and q(y i ) = q 0 imply that r(x i ) = q 0 . Therefore, if x i 0 , x i 1 ∈ X i are elements of the same connected component of G, r(x i 0 ) = r(x i 1 ), which implies (iii). 
We get an equivalent system of equations if r(x i ) = q 0 , and the proof is completed by induction on the cardinality of X i .
We also need to define an ε-faithful interpretation. First we define a metric Proof: The direct proof is obvious since a faithful interpretation is also a ε-faithful interpretation. For all ε > 0, the set of ε-faithful interpretations from I to J is compact in the set of interpretations from I to J endowed with the
. If these sets are non-empty, their intersection is also non-empty. 
Equivalence theorem
Construction of strategies in Γ(J , G) from strategies in Γ(I, G) and from φ
Assume that φ is an interpretation from I to J . Let G be a compact game,
and f a I-tuple of strategies in Γ(J , G). The I-tuple of strategies e in Γ(I, G)
is defined by e i (x i )(
Lemma 4.1 If φ is a compatible interpretation, e and f induce the same distribution on S.
Proof: Let B = B 1 × . . . × B I be a product of Borel subsets of S 1 , . . . , S I .
We get E µ e(x)(B)
= E µ Π i e i (x i )(B i ) = E µ Π i y i φ i (x i )(y i )f i (y i )(B i ) = E ν Π i f i (y i )(B i ) = E ν f (y)(B).
Lemma 4.2 If φ is faithful and f is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(J , G), e is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(I, G)
Proof: We use the remark 2.1. For
Since f is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(J , G), this is at most
This completes the first part of the proof of the main theorem.
Construction of a faithful interpretation if I is richer than J
First, we assume that the inclusion D(I, G) ⊃ D(J , G) is also satisfied when
G is an upper semi-continuous game, and prove the existence of a faithful interpretation under this assumption. Then we complete the proof of the main theorem using approximations of upper semi-continuous games by continuous games. announce as probability his conditional probability over the signals announced by the others. More precisely, e induces with µ a probability P e on X × Y ×
Case where the payoff function may be upper semi-continuous
An upper semi-continuous (or u.s.c.) game is given by ((S i
Y ) is the conditional probability on x i that the other players announce the signal s
.)
Lemma 4.3 e is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(I, G) if and only if for all i and
Proof: From remark 2.1, e is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all i and
Where 
Proposition 4.1 Assume that D(I, G) ⊃ D(J , G) for the previously defined u.s.c. game G, then J is faithfully reproducible from I.
Proof: Let the (pure) strategies in Γ(J , G) be defined by
).By lemma 4.3, f is a Nash equilibrium. Let e be a Nash equilibrium inducing the same distribution on the actions of G. An interpretation φ is given by φ i (x i )(y i ) = e i Y (y i ). The proposition is a consequence of the two next lemmas.
Lemma 4.4 φ is a compatible interpretation from I to J .
Proof: Just note that the marginals on Y of the distributions induced by e and f on S are ν and the image of µ by φ respectively.
Lemma 4.5 φ is faithful.
Proof: Take x i ∈ X i and y i ∈ Y i such that φ i (x i )(y i ) > 0. As e is a Nash equi-
As e and f induce the same distribution on the
Case where the payoff function is continuous
Here we approximate the game G = G(J ) by a family of continuous games
We study the best response correspondence of Γ(I, G K ), then we construct an interpretation from I to J from a Nash equilibrium of Γ(J , G) and prove that it is an ε-faithful interpretation.
, and δ (y −i ) = 0 otherwise.
Write a = j∈J γ(j) and b = γ(j 0 ). We get
Since a + b ≤ 1,
Proof: Take 0 < ε < 1 2 . As Y −i is finite, we can take
Now we can construct ε-faithful interpretations.
Proposition 4.2 If I is richer than J , there exists an ε-faithful interpretation
is a Nash equilibrium. Take a Nash equilibrium e of Γ(I, G K ) inducing the same distribution on S as f , and let e i Y (x i ) and e i ∆ (x i ) be the marginals of e i (x i ) on Y i and ∆(Y −i ). An interpretation from I to J is again defined by φ i (x i ) = e i (x i ). We see, as in the case where G is u.s.c., that φ is a compatible interpretation. We have to prove that φ is ε-faithful.
since f is a Nash equilibrium. This finally proves that
Proof of Theorem 4.1: As seen in proposition 3.1, the existence for all ε > 0 of an ε-faithful interpretation from I to J implies the existence of a faithful interpretation. 
This proves that φ is ε-faithful for all ε, and therefore φ is faithful.
Equivalence classes -Examples
examples
Example 5.1
With two players we represent information structures by matrices. Each cell contains its probability to be drawn, player 1 is informed about the row, and player 2 about the column.
Let φ be the interpretation from I 2 to I 1 defined by φ 1 (x 2 ) = φ 1 (y 2 ) = x 1 , φ 1 (z 2 ) = y 1 for player 1, and φ 2 (a 2 ) = φ 1 (b 2 ) = a 1 , φ 1 (c 2 ) = b 1 for player 2. φ is a faithful interpretation from I 2 to I 1 . We see that in I 3 the second and third columns are the same, as are the first and second rows. If we set φ 1 (x 3 ) = φ 1 (y 3 ) = x 1 , φ 1 (z 3 ) = y 3 , and φ 2 (a 3 ) = a 1 , 
Equivalence relation
φ 2 (b 3 ) = φ 2 (c 3 ) = b 1 ,
Deterministic interpretations
Definition 5.2 A interpretation φ from I to J is said to be deterministic when for every x i ∈ X i , the support of φ i (x i ) is a singleton, that is when φ i is a mapping from X i to Y i .
Example 5.3
This is the case of the interpretation from I 2 and I 3 to I 1 , but not of the one from I 1 to I 3 . 
Concluding remarks.
We have introduced a dual approach to the classical approach of correlated equilibria. We considered normal form games extended by information structures, but rather than making the information structure vary to get all the correlated equilibrium distributions of the normal form game, we compared two information structures by making the normal form game vary. We then obtained a characterization of "I is richer that J " where the normal form game does not appear.
The relation "I is richer that J " defines a partial order relation on the information structures. The smallest element is the trivial information structure where each player has only one signal that appears with probability one.
In this framework, the normal form games are supposed compact and the information structures finite. One may wonder if the main theorem holds with a smaller class of games (finite games for instance) and with a bigger class of information structures.
